Amitai Etzioni’s most recent book, *Security First*, provides a stipulation on the optimal future path of American foreign policy. As director of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies and professor of international politics at the George Washington University, Etzioni is best known for his work in socio-economics and communitarianism. Shifting his view in this book to American foreign and security policy, he expands his analysis to offer a direct alternative to a foreign policy based on democracy promotion – namely, a foreign policy where security is the foremost priority.

The author’s thesis centres on the need for change in the basic foreign policy of the United States. Since President Woodrow Wilson, America has emphasized democracy promotion in its foreign policy. Etzioni challenges guiding assumption in eloquent terms: ‘Democratization cannot lead; it must follow the establishment of basic security’ (p. xi). As the author points out, the ‘security first’ foreign policy offers a pragmatic, yet moral, approach to dealing with threats and opportunities abroad.

Instead, he contends that the most fundamental right is security, without which other rights cannot exist. In Etzioni’s words, ‘security commands moral preeminence’ (p. 5). Following this causal path, democracy will not take hold in any state or region if basic security is not already present. However, as the author aptly points out, the means of promoting democracy are both costly and complicated, and oftentimes fail to culminate in their attempted goal. The democratization processes also take a long time, as shown in Afghanistan and Iraq most recently, which also puts on hold global security based on democratic peace theory.

That said, however, the ideas and material covered in this book do not seem to match the calibre of its author. While the proposal emphasizing security as an *a priori* requirement for democracy is very convincing, its power lies not in Etzioni’s argumentation, but in the common sense logic of the connection between security and democracy. Nor is it a novel idea. Authors specializing in peace-building and democracy promotion literature long ago pointed out that while security is not directly determined by the nature of the domestic regime, democracy cannot exist without basic security. It is enough to look at the well-known work of Mansfield and Snyder, Carothers, Paris, Barany, or Diamond, etc., who have consistently stressed various aspects of security and their impact on political development and stability. What makes Etzioni’s book stand out is the sole and direct focus on the link between democratization and security – something that other authors treated peripherally or as a given.
In his determination to make his case, Etzioni, tends also to exaggerate. He argues that Russia, as a failing state, should be considered by Washington as the number one threat, because of its inability to control and secure its nuclear arsenal. The author writes: ‘The Russian federal government is consistently unable to implement its policies’ (p. 15). While the dispersed and badly guarded nuclear facilities present a potential danger, Russia can hardly be classified as a failing state. Furthermore, Etzioni poses that ‘the world is not democratizing’ (p. 19) and democracy has regressed in ‘Russia, Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere’ (p. 46). The most current Polity IV Country Reports (2006), however, show that globally, as well as regionally, the number of democracies has indeed increased in the past decade. While it is true that the rate of democratization has slowed, one can hardly argue that the process as a whole has stopped or reversed. Nevertheless, for Amitai Etzioni, the middle ground between democracies and non-democracies does not exist; he argues that democracies in transition are ‘faux democracies’ or ‘knockoffs’ (p. 48) that pose a serious threat to American national security as they ‘tend to be anti-Western, harm US interests, oppressive at home, and often support terrorism in other nations’ (p. 50). Juxtapose Etzioni impatience with the words of Hubert Védrine, the former French foreign minister, who said in 2001: ‘Democracy is not like instant coffee, where you can just add water and stir; it doesn’t result from a conversion, but a process.’

While Etzioni convincingly endorses promotion of security, he fails to address the issue of domestic and international audiences and their approval of such policy. He notes that a legitimate foreign policy requires support from the international community. Furthermore, he acknowledges the American moral obligation to provide basic security for itself and the rest of the world through the exercise of foreign policy based on security promotion through both hard and soft power. However, he does not speculate on the prospect of the American people supporting such a policy. Moreover, he does not discuss the potential legitimacy of a foreign policy which is supported domestically but rejected internationally, or vice versa.

The concepts of morality and legitimacy repeatedly appear throughout the book. Etzioni maintains that domestically it is the duty of the state to provide basic security. Furthermore, internationally, the major powers carry the obligation of providing basic security in the regions and states where there is none. Etzioni writes: ‘international community has a responsibility to intervene’ in the cases of genocide or ethnic cleansing (p. 31). The natural question is: who should take initiative in fulfilling this moral obligation? Does this responsibility rest with the United States, the United Nations, security alliances, coalitions, other international organizations? None of those questions are answered, however.

Sometimes, Etzioni says, the world needs to settle for the second-best option, security over democracy. In terms of international security, he asks what is more important: regime change within the state planning nuclear capability, or security guarantees for the rest of the international community? Which one will provide more stability and security globally? The author maintains that the best way to deal with potential proliferators is to forget regime change and stress engagement, provide guarantees that their regimes will not be threatened, and political and
economic incentives for cooperation. There are limits here. Although historical analogies provide important lessons, one must be careful in choosing applicable comparisons. The cases of North Korea and Iran are different from that of Libya, and long-term consideration of regime change may be unavoidable.

Etzioni offers a valuable and effective introductory volume into the complicated nature of security and morality in international relations. But common sense is not enough. The author effectively fails to supply any substantial discussion on the issue of anarchy in the international system or determination of the specific one state, political entity or international institution that would have the power, legitimacy, and willingness to provide security to others. Subsequently, the reader is left with a sense of a rather superficial and incomplete approach to an important issue. *Security First* would be much more effective in selling its advice for the direction of the future American foreign policy with a significantly narrower scope and much deeper discussion of the supporting empirical and theoretical arguments.

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Hillel Frisch and Efraim Inbar have skilfully assembled academic and policy experts on radical Islam for a timely analysis of the challenges contemporary Islamist ideology and activist terrorist groups pose to Western states and their Muslim state allies as well, and for an overview of the current responses and potential solutions to such critical challenges. Whilst most of the contributing authors in *Radical Islam and International Security* broadly agree with Frisch and Inbar’s thesis that ‘radical Islam poses a challenge to the state-based and broadly secular international system . . . in addition to the states and societies that make up that system’ (p. 1), the various contributing authors diverge on explaining the causal mechanisms that have brought about the development of contemporary radical Islamist activism and the rise of local and loosely connected transnational terrorist networks based on Islamist grievances. Differences between authors also arise throughout the volume in relation to what actual solutions must be brought to bear in order to defeat Islamism.

The first part of the book concentrates on general themes relating to the ideological foundations of radical Islam. Bassam Tibi raises the distinction between traditional *jihad*, and *jihadism*. Tibi argues that *jihadism* is a ‘recent edition’ (p. 13) to political Islam arising out of the early 20th century and mostly originating from the writings of Islamist Hasan al-Banna. Tibi discredits the thesis propounded by other ‘self-proclaimed experts’ (p. 16) that Islamists are trying to re-establish the Caliphate in the international system. Instead, he contends that current jihadists are intent rather on achieving something more sinister, that is, the creation of a much grander ‘Islamic order’ (*nizam Islami*), whereby a system of divine rule would be instituted, whilst *Shari’a* law would provide a legal basis for such an institutional
arrangement. Under such a world-system Islamist cultural as well as religious principles would, thus, not only reign over political, but also cultural and religious matters. Such an order would replace what is currently regarded by Islamists as the current *Pax Americana*. More surprising is Tibi’s notion that such an order is not only longed for by radical Islamists, but also by ‘moderate’ Islamists. The difference between the two groups is the means that need to be employed in order to achieve such an end, but not the ultimate establishment of the *nizam Islami* itself.

Due to Islamists’ intransigence over the long-term establishment of an Islamic order, Tibi maintains that European states in particular should adopt policies that would lead to ‘Europeanizing Islam’ (p. 31). This would be achieved by co-opting non-Islamist Muslim groups into helping European governments fight domestic Islamists through the war of ideas, by making greater efforts in integrating alienated Muslims into the state’s political and socio-economic centre, and by continuing to encourage Muslim states in pushing forward with democratic reforms.

The second part of the book as a whole tends to focus somewhat on European-based Islamist activism and recruitment given that recent attacks, such as 9/11, the Madrid and 7/7 London bombings, have relied mostly on foreign, but also more ominously on local European-based Islamist manpower. Notwithstanding the fact that, as contributors Joseph Kostiner, and Rushda Siddiqui and others elucidate, the proliferation of contemporary Islamist ideological propaganda, safe havens, and operational bases originate for the most part from the Persian/Arabian Gulf (mainly Saudi Arabia) and Central Asia (mainly Afghanistan and Pakistan), the greatest threat of radicalization and recruitment into Islamist terrorism may be situated within the Muslim community residing in Europe.

Michael Laskier and Jonathan Paris, for example, examine in detail the causal factors leading to the radicalization and recruitment of young second- and third-generation European Muslims, often of Maghrebi origin in Continental Europe and of South Asian origin in Britain. The authors contend that this population has increasingly begun to find solace and a sense of belonging and identity by joining Islamist groups that are able to channel their alienation, frustration and eventually their ‘identity of vicarious grievances that European Muslims feel for their brethren in Palestine, Iraq, Chechnya, and Kashmir’ into Islamist activism (p. 125). These authors highlight not only the growing trend of Islamist radicalization in Europe, but also the conundrums that higher Muslim birth rates will pose to European societies in the future. In spite of significant counter-terrorism efforts on the part of European states that are already facing this ‘demographic time bomb’, most notably, Holland, France, Britain, Spain, and Italy, Paris argues that the essential aspect in fighting Islamist activism in Europe is ‘to counter the political agendas of Islamists’ in general and not just those advocating or employing political violence (p. 131). Laskier goes even further by calling for tougher measures in Europe. He advocates, amongst other things, the necessity for European governments to adopt tougher legislation as well as more resilient intelligence and counter-terrorism methods, but also much stricter immigration policies in order to stem the steady inflow of Muslim immigrants though which Islamists can infiltrate more easily local Muslim populations.
The third part of *Radical Islam and International Security* focuses specifically on how Western states and their Muslim state allies can respond effectively to the growing threat of Islamist terrorism in the 21st century. Whilst part two focuses on specific country case studies in Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia, and on these states’ domestic counter-terrorism policies, part three provides a more general analysis of the global threat of transnational Islamism. Authors stress the difficulties in deterring Islamist terrorists through the use of pre-emptive as well as retaliatory military force (Laurent Murawiec), and of the possible misguided American/European policy of encouraging democratization in Muslim states without really taking into consideration their ripeness for such institutional reforms (Daniel Byman). Byman, in fact, judiciously advocates the need to help weak states initially with institution-building efforts and thereafter with democratization.

Finally, Jonathan Stevenson wraps up by providing in the book’s last chapter a general summary and overview of American counter-terrorism policy since the start of the global war on terrorism. Stevenson maintains that American policy has so far focused too much on the kinetic/military aspect of the conflict. Such a focus has, in fact, led to the ‘operational dispersal’ of *jihadists*, which in turn has made further counter-terrorist efforts more complex. It has also led the United States to overlook the fact that the conflict within Islam [and against Islamism] is [an] ideological one (p. 218).

Furthermore, whilst Stevenson implicitly criticises America’s predominantly current kinetic approach against contemporary Islamist terrorism, and Byman goes even far as to allude that ‘Al Qaeda attacks the United States primarily for policy reasons such as the American military presence in the Middle East and its support for Israel’ (p. 191), I was bewildered by Singer’s contention, when analysing the threat of *jihadism* to the United States, that ‘in 1966 or 1976, there was no substantial movement for *jihad*-now, although all the fundamental reasons for *jihad* were just as great then as they are today’ (p. 175).

Although many disparate factors have contributed to the radicalization and spread of Islamist ideology and activity over the last four decades, and even though one cannot discount the reality that some Islamist groups oppose the United States and the West merely for what they stand for from a political, cultural, and even religious point of view, to state that reasons for *jihadist* terrorism have pretty much remained constant over the last 40 years flies in the face of increasing American interventionism in Middle Eastern politics since the late 1960s, whether, for example, in the guise of growing support for Israel or in the semblance of military alliances and interventions in the Arabian/Persian Gulf. From being an ‘over the horizon’ to a ‘constantly in sight’ hyperpower, the United States has alienated Muslims in the Middle East and throughout the world.

In any case, this volume overall is a welcome addition to the growing critical literature on current counter-terrorist efforts vis-à-vis Islamist ideologies as well as against domestic and transnational terrorist networks motivated by such ideologies. The analysis and critiques put forward by the various authors are compelling and based on well-researched sources. Readers interested in the challenges of Islamist radicalization within Muslim states as well as within Muslim populations scattered

Yoichi Funabashi, editor-in-chief of the authoritative and leading Japanese daily newspaper, Asahi Shimbun, provides his readers with a rare opportunity to learn something new about North Korea and Asia Pacific security and to do so in a way that is both highly readable and analytically incisive.

The ground covered by Funabashi is at first sight well-trodden. The book comprises an account of what is conventionally understood as the ‘second nuclear crisis’ – starting in 2002 and still, at July 2008, rumbling through continued negotiations involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), the United States, South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan. These negotiations followed those that constituted the first North Korean nuclear imbroglio, which took place in 1993–1994 and ended with bilateral negotiations between the DPRK and the United States, the signing of the Geneva agreement of 1994 and the creation of the now defunct Korean peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO).

Funabashi’s work has much to offer to Korean security studies, however, in a number of ways. First of all, he offers new data and informed analysis from the perspective of all the partners in the multinational process of conflict resolution and denuclearisation on the Korean peninsula, now known as the ‘Six party talks’. Unusually in the English-speaking world of Korean security analysis, Japan, China, South Korea and Russia are as well covered in this book as are the United States and the DPRK; in the case of the first four Funabashi brings into the public arena very substantial new material that has hitherto been unrecorded and unknown.

Much of this book is based on hundreds of detailed anecdotes drawn from what are the author’s manifestly extensive contacts in the decision making echelons of the six powers engaged in trying to find a multilateral solutions to Korean security dilemmas. The differing memories of North Korean and Russian diplomats of the North Korean capture of the US espionage ship, the USS Pueblo in 1968 (pp. 193–4) provide just one of these fascinating glimpses into Asia-Pacific security relationships. The interchange between US and Chinese diplomats on Kim Jong Il’s visits to China (p. 445) where the former express some scepticism about the DPRK’s willingness to embrace radical economic reform provides, another fascinating vignette.

By themselves, anecdotes, however interesting in themselves, would not have been enough to make this book a genuine addition to the scholarly literature on Asia Pacific security. This is partly because the anecdotes are sometimes based on anonymous sources and therefore, in scholarly terms, the knowledge gained from them cannot be
replicated and therefore cannot ‘count’ as knowledge. What is substantively significant
about this book, however, is that it challenges the unfortunately too common approach
that evaluates Korean security dilemmas from only the perspective of the United States.
There is nothing wrong and much to be commended in having a point of view in schol-
larly analysis – whatever that is – but what goes wrong is when that point of view
occludes other perspectives and other analyses. In contrast to the majority perspective,
this book recognises United States allies as well as adversaries had sometimes conflict-
ing interests, attitudes, and objectives in negotiating with North Korea and ‘The Penin-
sula Question’. It was very difficult, for instance, for observers informed by a
perspective that assumes that American interests are identical to those of Japan in
relations with North Korea to understand why former Japanese prime minister
Jun’ichiro Koizumi went twice to Pyongyang. Japan of course, although the United
States’ closet ally in north-east Asia, had its own national interest at stake in the
Korean peninsula question and, importantly, did not find the US way of non-engagement
helpful to the pursuit of these interests. The differences between allies as well as adver-
saries are explored by Funabashi, who provides a wealth of detail that will be useful to all
scholars and policy analysts attempting to evaluate these multinational relations.

Funabashi also provides valuable insight into the ‘inside the beltway’ dynamics of
United States decision-making on North Korea. The vicious Department of State
infighting that caused paralysis on North Korean decision-making throughout the
first of the second Bush administrations is depicted in all its scurrilous and sometimes
amusing detail. Funabashi cites, for instance, one State Department official saying of
arch-North Korea sceptic Under-Secretary of State John Bolton, that ‘When North
Korea called him [Bolton] human scum, actually it was not too much off the mark
of how he was perceived here [in the State Department]’ (p. 144).

The value of the discussion of intra-US governmental dynamics is not, however,
primarily for its entertainment value. It is because American historiography of the
Korean crises has generally either ignored intra-US administration dynamics and
the effect on North Korean security, or it has been self-serving, with various partici-
pants in US policy-making publishing memoirs that can be valuable but are, inevita-
bly, self-justificatory. The result has been to potentially skew the public record.
Policy homogeneity towards the DPRK, only existed in the United States (and
between the various partners in the six party talks) at a very high level of generality.
Funabashi, however, has used his access to intra-governmental decision-making
inside the United States and his evident position as ‘trusted outsider’ to analyse differ-
ences between policy-makers and it is this that adds to our knowledge about United
States policy-making towards Korea.

This long book contains not one page too many and by the time I had finished the
book I was hoping for the next edition. This book is a rare find among the plethora of
literature on North Korea and Asia Pacific security. It is well-written, informative,
and knowledgeable. The evident journalistic skills that underlie this book mean
that, again unusually, a contribution to knowledge becomes a pleasure to read.

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In March 2006, six retired American generals publicly called for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to resign. He failed to heed professional military advise in many areas, they argued, and the debacle in Iraq was but one result. Rumsfeld resigned after the November elections and resentment toward his tenure soon found voice among the active duty military. Army Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling shifted the debate by placing the blame on America’s general officer corps in print. He argued that his superiors did not ‘possess the intelligence to visualize future conflicts and the moral courage to advise civilian policymakers on the preparations needed for our security’, (‘A Failure of Generalship’, Armed Forces Journal, May 2007). By broadening the assessment, Yingling helped direct the officer corps toward critical self-reflection. Under the leadership of Secretary Robert Gates, these problems have been managed much more skilfully, but few doubt they will reemerge next time American civilian leaders try to take the armed forces in directions different than they would prefer.

Christopher Gibson, a decorated Army Colonel with a doctorate in Government from Cornell University, extends this postmortem and shifts responsibility to institutions and norms in Securing the State. His primary claim is that the normative basis for civil–military relations in the United States is underdeveloped and this has allowed ‘power … to be centralized in one person, an unelected official, at the expense of those who have spent an adult lifetime developing, refining, and applying expert knowledge – the members of the profession of arms’ (p. 116). Gibson deftly uses the literature on civil–military relations to make this argument. In doing so, he has ensured that Securing the State will frame the institutional response of the officer corps to the travails of this decade much as Colonel Harry Summers’ On Strategy (Dell, 1982) and then-Major H.R. McMasters’ Dereliction of Duty (HarperCollins, 1997) retrospectively shaped their responses to Vietnam.

Gibson uses Peter Feaver’s agency theory of civil–military relations (from Armed Servants, Harvard University Press, 2003) to frame his argument that civilian control of the military entails fealty to elected civilian principals – the president as commander-in-chief and the Congress in their funding and oversight capacities – but not necessarily to appointed civilian officials such as the Secretary of Defense. ‘[T]hat person along with the nation’s top general officers is a servant or “agent” for the nation’s elected leadership’(Gibson, p. 3). He uses this framework to consider historical role models for (im)proper civil–military relations and to evaluate the objective and subjective control arguments of Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Richard Kohn, and Eliot Cohen.

Gibson first evaluates four role models of civil–military relations (five if one counts his assessment of General Colin Powell’s relations with Presidents George H.W. Bush and William J. Clinton). He argues that Generals George Washington and George Marshall collaborated as equals with their civilian counterparts and
principals (the Continental Congress and Secretary of War Henry Stimson and President Franklin D. Roosevelt), engaging in frank discussions and taking the initiative when necessary, even if this stretched the limits of civilian intent. These generals led successful war efforts. On the other hand, Gibson argues that Generals Earle Wheeler and Richard Meyers were ‘in a disadvantageous position ... with regard to profession[al] preparation to wield influence at the civil–military nexus’ and embraced norms of exaggerated civilian control that allowed themselves to be subordinated to Secretaries of Defense McNamara and Rumsfeld (p. 50). Wheeler and Myers were associated with failed wars. Gibson draws a correlation between civil–military relations and outcomes: ‘a balanced arrangement among the participants of the civil–military nexus ensures that elected leaders have access to strategic analysis, courses of action, and advice from all key advisors. This kind of functional foundation is necessary for successful policy outcomes’ (p. 64).

Gibson next considers objective and subjective control of the military – two concepts developed by Huntington in his landmark The Soldier and the State (Harvard University Press, 1957). Objective control delineates between civilian and military spheres of expertise, accords the military autonomy in their sphere, and relies upon professional norms of respect for civilian control (and enlightened self-interest) to keep officers from encroaching into politics. Gibson contends that objective control denies the Clausewitzian interaction of military and political aspects of strategy at the highest levels and therefore is untenable. Subjective control accepts this interaction and focuses upon taming the military through civilian penetration and political control of the officer corps. Gibson argues that Janowitz, Kohn, and Cohen prescribe variants of subjective control and finds each of their views wanting as they deny elected civilians the expert knowledge of the professional military. He suggests that a new normative structure is necessary to guide civil–military relations.

Gibson proposes a Madisonian approach to civil–military relations, whereby the potential for tyranny (of the Secretary of Defense over the military [p. 102]) is moderated by deliberate structural rivalry within the ‘civil–military nexus’. First, he argues that the authority of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must be strengthened. Since 1986 that officer has not been in the chain of command when the United States military engages in war; rather, the regional Combatant Commanders report to the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman and the service chiefs are not warfighters in this respect; rather, they provide forces to the combatant commanders as requested and deal with peacetime issues of arming, training, and equipping their forces. Gibson proposes reinserting the Chairman into the warfighting chain of command so that he has authority over all aspects of the military and cannot be sidelined as General Myers was during the planning and execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom. This would increase cooperation between the services (jointness), reduce interservice rivalry, and focus service training and procurement on the needs of the combatant commanders. It would also ensure that the primary statutory military advisor to the President could perform his duties more effectively, as responsibility without adequate knowledge and authority is a recipe for poor performance.
Second, he proposes that all advice on defence matters pit the civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense against the military services and the combatant commanders. He argues that the President should receive competing recommendations from the Secretary and the Chairman on all issues, from decisions whether and how to use force, to developing the National Military Strategy, budgeting and programming, and campaign planning. While multiple advocacy is certainly a remedy to the autocratic group-think that characterized decision-making in the Bush administration, Gibson’s recommendation pits thousands of able officers on the joint staff, the staffs of the services, and those of the combatant commands against the much smaller civilian staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense – a fact of which Gibson is well aware. In the world of staff work, brilliance counts for little against sheer numbers.

Taken together, Gibson’s recommendations strengthen the voice of military professionals and focus their efforts in direct opposition to those of civilian appointees. While they are a remedy for future McNamaras and Rumfelds, they certainly are not consonant with the subordination of the military to civilian authority. Indeed, Gibson’s structural remedies are anti-Madisonian, stilted as they are to the military’s advantage, and rely upon the continued culture of subordination that he rails against to ensure continued civilian control of the military. In my judgment that is too thin a defence against the potential for tyranny in our Republic. Gibson and his fellow officers are honourable and patriotic Americans and none seek to undermine the foundations of their country. Yet Securing the State is an eloquent testament to how liberty can be undermined even by the best intentions. It should be read with care by all who wish to better understand the current state of American civil–military relations and the dangers ahead.

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Jeanne Giraldo and Harold Trinkunas, faculty members at the Naval Postgraduate School, have compiled contributions to a December 2004 conference on terrorism financing into an excellent collection that will be of interest to policy-makers and scholars alike. The book is divided into two main sections. The first section includes several chapters providing an overview of the landscape of terrorism financing. The second section includes case studies of various organizations and regions, explaining both the methods of financing and state responses to them.

The editors’ own first chapter on the ‘political economy’ of terrorism financing presents an interesting overview of the major issues. There are a few discrepancies between chapters in this section, and these seem to highlight the complexities of the issues involved and reasonable differences among different authors about a
topic in which perfect intelligence is impossible. For instance, Nikos Passas in Chapter 2 dismisses the popular ‘blood diamonds’ hypothesis connecting the illicit African diamond trade to al-Qaeda, suggesting that journalism on this topic has been unsubstantiated and incestuously reliant on a small number of related reports. Other authors in the book seem to accept the conventional view with less scepticism. Perhaps better acknowledgement of such differences between chapters would lead to greater coherence in the volume. Nonetheless, relative rarity of such disagreements minimizes the significance of any opportunity for improvement here. The last chapter of the section, by University of Pittsburgh Professor Phil Williams, presents a provocative question: Do efforts to restrict terrorist finances really matter? He concludes with several insightful policy recommendations. (I will do Stanford University Press the favour of not disclosing these here, but rather encourage you to explore this chapter for yourself.)

The second section of the volume presents more specific analyses of terrorist financing, looking at specific geographies (such as Afghanistan and Europe) and organizations (such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah). These case studies are not meant to be exhaustive, but rather to illustrate key trends and factors. The section also includes a discussion of government responses, which are more comprehensive than the series of chapters on terrorist organizations. These include governments in the Arab world, East Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America as well as Europe and the United States. Financing brings together the nexus of political terrorism, organized crime, and the narcotics trade. The case studies of this section explore how these factors interact and how governments in different contexts of security capabilities and political will are acting to combat them.

Targeting terrorist financing is distinctive as a counterterrorist method because it is both embraced by the right as an effective way to disrupt operations and accepted by the left because it avoids anti-war and civil liberties concerns. As of this review, there has not been a second attack on the United States since 9/11. The ‘War on Terror’ has used a variety of other tools to disrupt terrorist organizations with international reach, including aggressive military action in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places; increased telephonic surveillance; enhanced interrogation methods; detention facilities with limited rights of due process (at Guantanamo and elsewhere). However, among these various tools, terrorism financing alone has not attracted criticism from anti-war or civil liberties constituencies. In fact, the New York Times editorial page called for such measures in September 2001. The Times’s criticism of the secret Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (in June 2006) seemed to contradict the paper’s earlier editorial opinion, but this can be explained by reduced vigilance due to the passage of time since 9/11 and a hostility towards secrecy in national security efforts (a hostility manifested to full effect as the paper’s breaking story compromised the program’s secrecy). In any case, terrorist financing has not attracted the antagonism that other counterterrorist efforts have. As a tactic around which a broad consensus has converged, targeting terrorism financing will be here to stay. At the same time, since financing efforts are conflated with legitimate charities and organized crime, it is difficult to gather reliable information on what money and processes fund terrorists rather than other objectives. As such, scholarly efforts
such as Jeanne Giraldo and Harold Trinkunas’s *Terrorism Financing and State Responses* will continue to be important in understanding an unclear but central lever in the fight against terrorists.

Matthew J. Morgan

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Professor Joes’ collection of case studies warrants praise as a clear example of the comparative method being applied to new topics. Plain and unpretentious language – following George Orwell’s *Politics and the English Language* – is another strong point of this book. Others include an international selection of case studies, use of non-American references, including Vietnamese material, and clear avowal of the author’s own worldview.

Each of the eight case studies begins with a simplified description of the historical setting of the urban guerrilla campaign being analyzed. They proceed to describe the course of the fighting and the tactics used by the regular armies and the urban guerrillas. Each concludes with reflections, later developed into qualified recommendations for the United States military. Joes argues that the United States should not fight urban guerrilla campaigns, but he also is realistic enough to set up the criteria to use to create strategies that would enable it to do so, should it have no other choices: isolating the urban areas, getting and using proper intelligence, and political preemption of the insurgents. Even the weaker case studies are useful as introductions to conflict situations and the author’s coverage of the operations entailed within them remains solid.

Russia is over-represented here, direct combatant in two of the case studies (Budapest and Grozny) and deeply implicated in the Warsaw case study. The United Kingdom (Northern Ireland), France (Algiers), the United States (Saigon), and Nazi Germany (Warsaw) get a case each. The two remaining case studies involve Brazil (São Paulo) and Uruguay (Montevideo). There are also comparisons to the United States in Fallujah, the Thebans in Plataea, as well as standard references to the British in Malaya.

In contrast to the news media, obsessed with American blundering, Joes tends to drip venom on Russia. Readers should be wary of an anachronistic tendency to treat the Russian ‘menace’, ‘duplicity’, ‘betrayal’, and ‘brutality’. Yet in a gesture towards balance, Joes provides a clear warrant for the Soviet decision not aid the Warsaw Ghetto and the Home Army uprisings in Poland – Polish policy under Marshal Pilsudski aimed to transform Russia into a second-rate power. Inter-war Poland had not only defeated the Soviet Union, it had plans to displace it; consequently, it is within the normal parameters of state behaviour for the Soviets to withhold aid to the Polish Home Army and to seek the creation of a friendlier government in post-war Poland. Of course, this does not excuse the human-rights violations
committed by the Red Army in Poland, particularly the Katyn Massacre and the suppression of the legitimate government of Poland, which the author clearly condemns. He is also correct in taking issue with the American and British distrust of and hostility towards the Catholic conservatism of Poland.

The Grozny case study is also somewhat weak. First, the Chechens’ own internal divisions concerning relating to the rest of the Russian Federation are not at all addressed. Chechen president Dzhokhar Dudayev ordered the disembowelment of leaders of pro-Moscow Chechen clans and displayed the heads on poles set on the boulevards of Grozny, and yet this finds no reference in Joes’ work. The book’s image of the Chechens as a unified, monolithic community sharply contrasts with its more accurate image of the Irish and the Algerians as divided and at war with each other as much as with the British and the French. The case study also concludes with General Alexander Lebed’s withdrawal from Grozny and does not address the current situation. Beslan is strangely absent, and Chechen atrocities against other regional peoples receive only passing treatment, although their regional unpopularity due to historic slave-raiding and banditry is begrudgingly acknowledged. The author believes that that the essence of the lessons to be learned in Chechnya is that of Russian defeat; another view would focus on the response of the Russian state to the Moscow Theatre hostage-taking by Chechen terrorists. Another weakness is the lack of a clear definition for terrorism. The Algerian FLN (National Liberation Front), the Orange Order and the Tupamaros are ‘terrorists’, but IRA activists retain their ‘gunman’ respectability at least on one occasion. Sometimes, the author refrains from using the term even with movements that more than warrant its application, such as the Chechen separatists and the Viet Cong.

Despite this, Joes’ overall treatment of Vietnam is superb. He outlines how the war was lost by the United States not on the battlefield but on the television screen, thereby revealing the need for strict isolation and control of the media during warfare, particularly because journalists are ignorant of the operational art of counterinsurgency and are often committed to a confrontational and negative paradigm in their dealings with governments. The chapter on Algeria is also superbly executed, although Joes uses only one Arab source. The chapter on Latin America and Marighella’s *foquista* theory of urban guerrilla warfare is also well-written with a deep commitment to balance; the author makes sure to include leftist critiques of violence as well as conservative voices.

In many ways, however, the book’s best chapter is probably the Northern Ireland case study. While there are occasional lapses in the chapter, including a simplified depiction of the Orange Order, there is a great deal of sophistication when addressing the Catholic community, particularly the role of the Church and the stance against violence taken by many Catholics there; he plainly explains that a march by Catholic women against ‘violence’ meant a march against the IRA. He also explains that IRA membership placed ‘gunmen’ outside the Catholic Church, so the terms ‘Catholic’ and ‘Protestant’ cannot and do not quite fit the role of descriptive categories for the parties throughout whole conflict, although they are proper in many circumstances.

Despite the author’s treatment of Russia, this is a well-written book that warrants serious consideration not only for the skill with which the author has composed it
along with the wonderful application of the comparative method, but precisely for the clarity of the author’s perspective. It will be useful reading anywhere counterinsurgency is taught, as an ideal introduction to the topic of urban warfare.

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Brynjar Lia examines activist life of Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Setmariam Nasar, better known as Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, one of the leading if not foremost strategists working for, or rather with, al-Qaida. Lia’s intellectual biography of the in-house von Clausewitz of al-Qaida details his development from his struggle against the then-nascent Alawaite government in Syria to his capture in Quetta, Pakistan by Pakistani security forces.

The book begins and ends with Nasar’s capture in Quetta. The chapter between examine phases in the deeply troubled and troubling life. The book uses Nasar’s own writings, interviews with acquaintances, captured documents, news reports, and court and police records to explore his life as a jihadi. The work is extremely impressive and contains the essence of Nasar’s life, his ‘ministry’ if you will. It meets any and all reasonable criteria for academic rigour, including the use of neutral language; given the topic, a serious challenge.

The book offers the reader a rare insight into the personalities of the jihadi movement and their degree with which personalities and the personal relationships between jihadis have shaped the movements collectively called al-Qaida today. More importantly, it shows clearly how the network of personal relationships formed by the jihadis has had a direct influence on events. For example, Nasar clearly worked in London to support the Algerian jihad, apparently because he had promised an Algerian friend to do so while the two fought the Soviets in Afghanistan.

As a ‘born critic’, Nasar lacked many of the diplomatic skills strategists need to persuade policy and decision-makers of their visions and views. For example, he clearly tried to persuade bin Laden to clear all operations with the Taleban beforehand, but he lacked the political skills and networks to do so. While he was isolated, his assessment of the balance of power and of the possible response of the United States turned out to be quite accurate. His failure to influence al-Qaida policy may become the single most important factor in the eventual demise of that organization; had 9/11 not taken place, jihadi camps probably would still operating in Afghanistan, producing thousands of well-trained and motivated young men for wars within each Muslim state. In contrast to such a scenario, the Algerian civil war was a walk in the park. For the United States, its allies, friends and even its rivals with a shared interest in a stable Islamic world, the burden would have been overwhelming.
The book disputes some of the standard accounts of Nasar’s relationship with and support of al-Zarqawi’s campaign in Iraq. It also draws a more accurate picture of the jihadi movement in Afghanistan on the eve of 9/11 than has ever been portrayed before. The complexity of the movement, the role of al-Qaida within it, and the roles played by organizations that have merged with bin Laden’s structure are clearly elucidated in the work, with a degree of accuracy that shows the value of using the activist life of a key figure like Nasar as a guide. It outlines his difficult relationships with bin Laden and at least a dozen other jihadis, which were a function of his personality more than disputes over ideology or methodology. We are also treated to the strategic though of Nasar, particularly his use of Marxist and Western guerrilla thought. He is particularly fond of Robert Taber’s War of the Flea as well as the writings of Mao, Giap, and Castro. In short, Nasar advocates an Islamized form of Carlos Marighella’s foco theory, combined with leaderless resistance to produce a global series of lawless pockets that could be exploited to create a universal Islamic state. To achieve this goal, al-Qaida must become a system, not an organization (nizam la tanzim).

While the book is excellent in most respects, there are shortcomings waiting to be addressed in follow-up volumes. First, Nasar comes from an old Ottoman family in Aleppo, Syria. The town contains a very large Christian minority, including Syriac and Armenian Christians. It is also known for communal neighbourhoods, so it is a segregated town, using North American language. Before the establishment of Israel and the commencement of the Arab–Israeli wars, it also had a significant Jewish community. To what extent did Aleppo’s multiethnic environment contribute to his virulently anti-Christian and anti-Jewish views? The book does not clue us in at all; a brief but detailed investigation into his family’s inevitable dealings with minority groups would have been a welcome addition. In addition, it is clear that his family was part of Syria’s Sunni elites, which lost the struggle for power with the Army-based Alawite minority. How does his community socialize its youth, particularly young men, to view non-Sunni Syrians? This reviewer believes that the proclivity towards terrorism is largely produced at home, and that subsequent training and indoctrination play the role of emphasizing prejudices acquired in households.

Second, the book does not address Nasar’s personal psychology. We are given some clues. He is clearly a difficult person, a ‘born critic’. He abhors Western culture, but married a Spanish leftist whom he converted to Islam. There are simply too many contradictions in his character to enable a life untroubled by doubt. For example, he wrote his wife’s parents after his indictment for terrorist activity in Spain, assuring them that he would eventually clear his name. Why would an unapologetic jihadi reassure unrepentant heathens, even if they are his in-laws? And what of the role of his ex-leftist, formerly atheist wife, Elena Moreno? Did her views influence his opinions of the United States? Blaming America for supporting Arab regimes, a hallmark of al-Qaida thought including Nasar’s, contradicts the factual conflict between the United States and many Arab governments, notably Syria’s, Algeria’s, and Libya’s, which figure predominantly as case studies in Nasar’s work. The book concedes that leftist thought, particularly Maoist thinking, has influenced Nasar, but does not address the channels that this
influence has taken into his thoughts. Nasar may be the leading spokesman of Islamic extremism today, but he remains enigmatic, like much of his movement.

Third, the book does not address the question of the Arabic language at all. This is a serious problem when Quranic verses are being cited or when hadith is being referred to, because translations are never a sufficient vehicle for carrying the full meaning of such texts. Indeed, translations need to be accompanied by explanatory text that situates words in their appropriate context and details their baggage. While there is a warrant for using standard translations for the sake of brevity, a chapter on some of the key interpretive tools of the jihadi movement and the Quranic verses and hadiths associated with them would be helpful for readers outside the Middle East and distant from the notion that religious interpretations can serve as an ideology.

Fourth, the role and evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood in creating the current jihadi movement is not properly explored. Nasar’s life clearly shows how a generation of younger hot-heads broke loose from the Brotherhood, but such a conclusion risks simplifying the picture. It also risks exonerating the Brotherhood from responsibility for the violent activities of its breakaway institutional offspring – al-Qaida. In recent years, the Brotherhood has acquired a certain degree of respectability due to its perceived non-violence. It was even offered advice by Marc Lynch in the September–October 2007 issue of Foreign Policy. Unfortunately, its record from its founding to the present day suggests that such trust is sorely misplaced. It has been on a relentless campaign of violence not against the Egyptian state, but against Egypt’s Copts, since its founding. This suggests that its views on non-Muslims do not differ substantially from those of al-Qaida. This particular problem could have been easily corrected with a chapter detailing its internal stances and its views of non-Muslims, within a Middle Eastern context. To some extent, while Nasar’s views do not differ from those of the Brotherhood he joined in Syria as a young man, his actions do.

The book’s strengths far outweigh its weaknesses. Especially helpful are excerpts of Nasar’s writings and its superb bibliography. Lia’s biography also can be used to explore the internet for jihadi material through the use of internet archiving devices.

Perhaps the greatest strength of Lia’s study is to expose Nasar’s blunt assessment of the relative success of the United States campaign against al-Qaida in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The book shows that despite some serious setbacks, the United States effort against al-Qaida is working. It also provides us with a clear, albeit complex, picture of the organization’s strategic thinking, enabling its opponents, which now include all of the world’s governments, especially Arab ones, to react according.

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